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Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine how private equity (“PE”) ownership influences under-
pricing and long-term performance of initial public offerings (“IPOs”) in the Nordic countries. 
More specifically, this study compares IPOs with different private equity ownerships and tries to 
find differences in the first-day returns and aftermarket performances. PE refers to funds in-
vested in a private company by a PE investor in exchange for a stake of ownership in the com-
pany. PE investors create value to the target company e.g., by financing and developing the op-
erations and providing extensive network in different aspects of the business.  PE can be divided 
into three subcategories by the maturity and lifecycle of the target company. These are venture 
capital, growth equity, and buyout. When the target company has grown, PE investors divest 
their investments through exits.  An initial public offering is an example of an exit strategy, in 
which the target company’s shares are listed on a stock exchange for the first time. 
 
The final data sample consists of 279 IPOs issued in the time period of 2001 to 2018. Out of the 
279 IPOs, 215 are non-backed, 42 PE-backed, and 22 VC-backed. PE-backed IPOs refer to com-
panies invested by growth equity and buyout funds. The long-run performance is measured with 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (“BHARs”) and the drivers explaining the long-run performance 
are studied with four different OLS regressions. The drivers include several offer-, firm-, and 
ownership-specific variables. 
 
The Nordic PE Market is relatively young and has stayed as a minority in the academic literature.  
This study aims to contribute previous academic literature by extending the research to Nordic 
countries and provide insight about IPOs with different financial sponsors, the level of possible 
underpricing, and long-term performance.  
 
The results show that IPOs in the Nordic countries are underpriced on average and the level of 
underpricing differs whether the company is backed by a PE owner or not. The level of under-
pricing is even higher during hot issue markets. The long-run performance is also affected by the 
different PE owners. Previous academic literature suggests that PE-backed IPOs perform better 
than VC- and non-backed IPOs. In this study, the evidence is not unanimous as the results are in 
line with the previous academic literature in value-weighted terms but not in equal-weighted 
terms. Therefore, according to this study, it cannot be concluded whether a company having a 
PE owner in their operations creates long-term value compared to a company not having a PE 
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Private equity (“PE”) and its sub-categories venture capital (“VC”), growth capital, and 
buyout (“BO”) are sources to finance company’s operations to create value. Zeisberger, 
Prahl, and White (2017) describe how PE industry has developed through the credit 
crunch, financial crises, and bubble periods around the world. It has changed from fi-
nancial sponsors enhancing company’s operations and capital structure to financial 
sponsors committing to the company, providing active ownership, and building the com-
pany. Research “The state of Nordic private equity 2019” by Argentum shows how PE 
firms are more interested than ever to consider the sustainability issues in their invest-
ments and, thus being able to enhance the overall wellbeing in the world.  
 
PE funds’ success is measured e.g., in its capability to divest the portfolio companies 
profitably. An initial public offering, where a private company’s shares are issued to the 
public for the first time, is one example of the PE funds’ exit strategies. The previous 
academic literature is extensively focused on the phenomenon of underpricing and the 
aftermarket performance of IPOs. Additionally, the effect of private equity ownership 
on underpricing and aftermarket performance is emphasized in the literature. The prev-
alent evidence expects that IPOs backed by PE-backed perform better than VC- or non-
backed IPOs as e.g., studies by Brav and Gompers (1997), Levis (2011), Bergström, Nils-
son and Wahlberg (2006) show. However, Belghitar and Dixon (2011), and Buchner, Mo-
hamed and Wagner (2019) did not find performance differences between PE- and VC-
backed IPOs and is contrary to the prevalent evidence. 
 
The year 2020 was busy in the private equity market around the world. Covid-19 and its 
consequences pushed companies of all sizes and in different industries into a difficult 
position to figure out how they will manage in unexpected market conditions with re-
strictions. Figure 1 shows how the number of initial public offerings (“IPOs”) have devel-
oped in the U.S stock market during the 21st century, but also how unusual the year 2020 
has been. There have been 480 initial IPOs in 2020 compared to 233 IPOs in 2019. 
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Additionally, the previous time the IPO markets experienced high listing activity was dur-
ing the dot-com bubble in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 1. Annual IPOs, 2000-2020 (StockAnalysis 2021). 
 
 
Airbnb and Doordash are examples listed in the U.S in 2020. Doordash is operating in a 
food delivery industry that succeeded in the pandemic conditions whereas Airbnb 
needed to make significant decisions to survive in the lodging industry. An article about 
Airbnb and DoorDash’s IPOs by Danielle Abril (2020) shows that on the first trading day 
the Airbnb stock rose about 135% and Doordash stock 80%. High first-day returns are a 
common phenomenon for IPOs. Investors start hyping and become optimistic about the 
future outlook of the company, causing the stock prices to jump. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) identified the same phenomenon of irrational behave during the dot-com bubble 
in the early 21st century. The level of underpricing was eight times bigger than the aver-
age level of underpricing and the volume of IPOs was above average. Expectations im-
pact the stock price and without focusing on the cash flows and fundamentals of the 
listing firms, the investment may be an inferior choice in the long run. 
 
In the Nordic countries, Covid-19 decreased the amount and value of PE deals. However, 
37,1% of all European PE-backed IPOs were proceeded in the Nordics, which is the sec-
ond-highest share over the previous ten years. This study focuses on studying the 
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underpricing and aftermarket performance of PE-and VC-backed IPOs in the Nordic mar-
kets by using data from April 2001 to March 2018. Previous studies that have focused 
on the Nordic countries have not had as extensive dataset and, therefore this study can 
give more accurate results about the long-term performance of IPOs with different fi-
nancial sponsors. This study aims to contribute previous studies by providing research 
in the Nordic countries and being a guideline for future studies.  Additionally, this study 




1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine how IPOs with private equity ownership experi-
ence underpricing and how these IPOs perform in the long term in the Nordic countries 
in time period of 2001 to 2018. In this study, the long-term performance is considered 
as a 3-year holding period. Additionally, it is compared how different private equity own-
erships affect the underpricing and aftermarket performance. To conclude, this study 
aims to answer the question of whether private equity ownership adds long-term value 




The first hypothesis is based on the common phenomenon of IPOs, the underpricing. 
Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) have been among the first people to document that 
on the first trading day, issuing firm’s stock price has been substantially higher than the 
initial offer price. Brav and Gombers (1997), Bergström et al. (2006), and Belghitar and 
Dixon (2011) found that the level of underpricing differs whether the IPO is backed by a 
financial sponsor or not. By following these observations, the first hypothesis is formed 
as 
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H1: PE ownership influences the underpricing of IPOs in the Nordic markets 
Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000) found 
that IPOs tend to underperform their corresponding benchmark in the long term. How-
ever, when private equity ownership is a contributing factor, previous studies show that 
PE ownership has an effect on the long-run performance. Studies by Bergström et al. 
(2006) and Levis (2011), show that PE-backed IPOs perform better than VC-and non-
backed IPOs in Europe. Therefore, the second hypotheses can be formed as the preva-
lent evidence indicates 
H2:  IPOs with PE ownership perform better in the long run than IPOs with VC ownership 
or without any financial sponsor 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
This study is divided into six main chapters, covering both the theoretical and empirical 
parts of the topic. In the first chapter, the topic is introduced by briefly presenting the 
private equity market and how the market relates to initial public offerings. Additionally,  
the purpose of the study and the research hypotheses are introduced. The second chap-
ter focuses on explaining the concept of private equity and the value creation associated 
with private equity ownership. Moreover, different private equity exit strategies, such 
as initial public offering, are provided. In the third chapter, initial public offerings are in 
more detail in the scope. The listing process, IPO valuation, and the most common ano-
malies related to IPOs are discussed. Additionally, the previous academic literature re-
garding the performance of IPOs is presetented in general but also the performance of 
IPOs with different PE owners.  
 
The empirical part begins from the fourth chapter. The data is reviewed, the Nordic PE 
market is described and,  the methodologies and regression models are explained. The 
fifth chapter presents the results of the study for underpricing, aftermarket 
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performance and the regression models. The final chapter provides a summary, and con-
clusions of the study, together with ideas for further research.   
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2 Private equity ownership 
This chapter focuses on determining the concept of private equity so that the empirical 
part of this study is accessible. It is explained in more detail how private equity is divided 
into sub-categories and why firms should consider or pursue private equity investments.  
Additionally, private equity exit strategies are covered.  
 
 
2.1 Private equity 
A general definition for private equity is determined by Zeisberger, Prahl and, White 
(2017), whereby PE firms invest long-term capital usually to private companies in ex-
change for a stake of ownership in the company. According to Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009), a private equity fund is composed of investors, known as limited partners, who 
provide capital for future investments and management fees for the general partners.  
The limited partners can be institutional investors and individual investors. The general 
partner of the fund, the private equity firm, manages the fund and commits always a 
certain percentage of capital to the fund. 
 
Zeisberger et al. (2017) determine that limited and general partners aim to create return 
for the invested capital through the made investments. General partners receive man-
agement fees annually from limited partners and usually a 20 percent share of the fund’s 
excess net profits, known as a carried interest.  In turn, limited partners earn the rest of 
the profits.  In more detail, usually, the general partners do not receive any of the carried 
interest before the fund has managed to return all the invested capital and a minimum 
return, a hurdle rate, for limited partners. When this point is reached, the 80-20 split is 
in force. Figure 2 presents a basic structure of a PE fund and its fees. 
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Figure 2. PE fund and fee structure (Zeisberger et al. 2017) 
 
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) determine that a fund’s life cycle is typically from 10 to 13 
years which is divided into two time periods. The first period is the investment period 
when the fund is investing the raised capital to different companies. The second period 
is divided into holding and divestment periods, which are focused on returning the cap-
ital to the investors.  
 
Private equity can be categorized into three different investment types based on a 
fund’s investment thesis and the target company’s life cycle. These sub-categories are 
venture capital, growth capital, and buyout. In this study, PE refers to growth capital and 
buyout funds together and VC funds are considered as their own. 
 
Michala (2019) defines venture capital as investments into early-stage and fast-growing 
companies, that are usually based on new technologies or other innovations and where 
the risks are higher compared to growth equity and buyout funds. According to 
Zeisberger et al. (2017), VC funds have more companies in their portfolios in order to 
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diversify the risk and increase the possibility to find a successful investment. Venture 
capitalists help the startups to develop their innovations with the help of capital, exper-
tise and, networks and get in return a minority equity stake of the company. VC funding 
can be for seed-stage startups that have only the idea for the business or late-stage 
startups with an expanding business. In addition, VC funding is usually raised in several 
stages, allowing the target companies to be assessed and in later funding rounds, the 
capital is headed to the most promising investments. 
 
Zeisberger et al. (2017) describe growth equity funds as investments into more ad-
vanced businesses that have passed the start-up stage and have successful business 
models. The growth equity investors help the company to move to the next step in the 
development by building strong relationships between stakeholders and using the 
shared expertise. Growth equity investors aim for a minority equity stake in the com-
pany, similarly as VC investors. 
 
Buyout funds differ more distinctly from the other two categories with their features. 
Michala (2019) determines that buyout funds invest in more mature companies with 
over average profit margins, steady cash flows, and different structures of ownership. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) add that majority of buyout transactions are usually 
funded with a vast amount of debt, which enables higher returns for the equity stake. 
These transactions are called leveraged buyouts. According to Zeisberger et al. (2017), 
buyout investors receive the majority stake of ownership in the company, allowing them 
to structure e.g., the company’s financial, governance, and operational characteristics. 




2.2 Private equity value creation 
The reason why firms consider PE firms as an investor is the probable value creation for 
the target company and owners. Value creation is in interest for both the initial owners 
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and PE financial sponsors. PE firms can be considered as financial sponsors to the target 
companies because of the financing and help provided. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
divide the value creation into three categories: financial, governance and operational 
engineering. 
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) define that financial engineering is often referred to as the 
leverage brought by PE funds and the equity incentives given for the management teams 
of the portfolio companies. The benefits related to leverage are e.g., the tax-deductibil-
ity of interest payments that increases the value of the firm. However, the use of lever-
age also puts pressure on the management teams not to waste money. Acharya, 
Gottschaig, Hahn, and Kehoe (2013) found that the value created with leverage affected 
the average deal internal rate of return almost fifty percent in large PE transactions in 
Western Europe from 1991 to 2007.  
 
In governance engineering, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) describe that PE investors ac-
tively participate in the boards of the portfolio firms to control and affect their opera-
tions. PE investors e.g., change the whole management team if it becomes necessary. 
Additionally, PE investors are more actively involved in the boards of private firms than 
they are in public firms because the boards in private firms are smaller and they meet 
more often.  
 
According to Kaplan and Strömerg (2009), and Zeisberger et al. (2017) operational value 
creation is the main driver in the PE market nowadays. The tools are the same whether 
the value is created for public corporations or PE-backed firms. However, PE firms have 
the reputation to succeed at value creation and, therefore PE firms are appreciated in 
the industry. PE firms cannot do whatever it takes to generate returns as the quality of 
work has also an impact on the PE firm’s reputation. Operational engineering can include 
e.g., cutting costs, productivity improvements, or strategic changes.  
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Jensen (1986, 1989) describes that value can be created by making operational efficien-
cies, such as monitoring the firm, having management expertise, and high leverage ra-
tios. Brav and Gompers (1997) agreed with Jensen as the better performance of VC-
backed IPOs compared to non-backed IPOs was because of better management exper-
tise and the structure of corporate governance. Additionally, Brav and Gompers ob-
served that the reputation of the venture capitalist had also an effect on the long-term 
performance.  
 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) examined more deeply the reputation of a 
VC financial sponsor and how it affected the long-term performance of IPOs. They found 
that VC owners with good reputations can choose better portfolio firms and are more 
involved in the portfolio firms’ operations than VC owners with worse reputations. Ad-
ditionally, the results revealed that reputation influenced positively the long-run after-
market performance, similarly as Brav and Gompers (1997) observed. Therefore, the 
quality of work has an important purpose.  
 
In turn, Katz (2009) further examined how companies’ different ownership structure im-
pacts their earnings quality and the long-term aftermarket performance. The results 
were in line with Jensen (1986, 1989), and Brav and Gompers (1997). PE-backed firms 
had higher earnings quality and better long-term performance because of professional 
ownership, closed monitoring, and the reputation of the PE firm. In addition, if a com-
pany had a PE firm as a majority owner, the impact on the long-term performance was 
even better.  
 
 
2.3 Private equity exit strategies 
Zeisberger et al. (2017) determine that exit is the final part of the whole PE investment 
process. It is the process of realizing the created value by selling the equity stake fully or 
partially. There are three common exit types for buyout funds: a sale to a strategic buyer, 
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a secondary buyout, and an IPO. This chapter covers more deeply the three strategies in 
addition to presenting shortly other exit strategies.  
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) found that the sale for a strategic buyer and other private 
equity firms were the most popular exit strategies of all global exits in 1970 to 2007, 
covering over 62 percent of the exits. IPOs as exit strategies were only 14 percent of the 
exits. According to Argentum’s “The state of Nordic private equity 2019“ research, there 
were altogether 128 VC and PE exits in the Nordic PE market in 2019. Sale to a strategic 
buyer was the most common type: 51 percent of buyout exits and 85 percent of venture 
exits. In 2019, there were only three PE-backed IPOs in the Nordic PE market.  
 
 
2.3.1 Sale to a third party 
Michala (2019) determines the sale to a third party as a full exit with a full cash payment.  
Third parties can be either strategic or financial buyers and depending on the buyer, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the exit differ. Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) deter-
mine that strategic buyers are usually large corporations operating in the same or similar 
business and are hoping to merge the target company’s technology and operations with 
its own to gain synergies. Zeisberger et al. (2017) add that whether the target company 
is operating in a similar industry as the buyer, the process of due diligence is easier, and 
synergies are identified more easily. However, these observations may lead strategic 
buyers to provide higher valuations than financial buyers would. 
 
In turn, Zeisberger et al. (2017) define that financial buyers can be e.g., PE funds, hedge 
funds, or family offices. The sale to another PE fund is called a secondary buyout. Finan-
cial buyers spend more time on the due diligence process and familiarize themselves 
with the target company’s industry than strategic buyers. They are also more price sen-
sitive. However, financial buyers are more likely to execute the exit transaction as they 
have determined in advance a certain amount of capital to invest in a particular invest-
ment period.  
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According to Zeisberger et al. (2017), the sale to a third party is a more flexible choice 
for PE funds than IPO since the fund has more control over the exit process and the 
process is executed faster with lower costs. Additionally, IPO as an exit strategy includes 
strict terms determined by security laws, exchange rules, and underwriters that restrict 
the fund’s ability to control the process. 
 
 
2.3.2 IPO as an exit strategy 
An initial public offering is determined by Ritter and Welch (2002) as a stage of a private 
company’s life cycle where the company is taking its shares to a stock exchange for a 
public offering. Zeisberger et al. (2017) separate advantages and disadvantages for an 
IPO as an exit strategy. The main advantages are that IPOs have historically provided the 
biggest returns when compared to other exit strategies. Additionally, a successful IPO 
process has a positive effect on the PE firm through advancing its reputation and future 
fundraisings. The most important disadvantages are the possibility of a failed IPO pro-
cess at any stage and the costs associated with the listing. Levis (2011) adds that an IPO 
is also associated with liquidation consideration. When a company is going public the PE 
funds is not immediately getting a full exit due to lock-up agreements with underwriters. 
It can take several months to years to be able to sell the remaining shares. 
 
Ritter and Welch (2002) provide two different theories for firms’ decisions to go public. 
The first one is the life cycle theory. Zingales (1995) has presented the first formal theory 
of why firms go public. When companies are public, it is easier for the possible buyers 
to recognize the potential target companies. In addition, being public provides higher 
valuations for the companies as there is more information available and more potential 
buyers. According to Black and Gilson (1998), VC-backed IPOs are exits only for the VC 
funds and not for the initial owners, as the majority of the company’s control is back 
with the founders. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) describe that the life cycle of a com-
pany determines when it is worth going public. The company needs to be large enough 
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so that the listing costs are not too heavy, and so that the public trading adds value to 
the company. 
 
The second theory categorized by Ritter and Welch (2002) is the market-timing theory. 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) found that IPOs proceed when there is a bull market even 
though the company would need to wait for more favorable market conditions. Moreo-
ver, Chloe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) supported the latter phenomenon that compa-
nies are more willing to issue equity in an expansionary stage of the business cycle. Com-
panies are also ready to delay their IPOs if there are no other good-quality companies 
going public at the same time. Ritter and Welch prioritize the market conditions as the 
first motive to consider when going public and secondly, the life cycle of the company. 
 
Buchner, Mohamed, and Wagner (2019) found that PE-and VC-backed firms have differ-
ent reasons when going public. VC-backed firms are early-stage with bigger risks and 
without a proven track record and, therefore there prevails information asymmetry. The 
possible motive for VC-backed IPOs is to create a long-term reputation. Gompers’ (1996) 
theory supports the reputational perspective. The theory suggests that VC funds under-
price shares in order to ease their future portfolio companies’ IPOs. This helps the VC 
funds to build a good reputation and raise capital more successfully.  The motive for PE-
backed IPOs to go public, according to Buchner et al., can be the size of the transactions 
as PE funds invest in more mature firms. Due to this reason, BO funds may divest their 
ownership too quickly.  
 
 
2.3.3 Other exit strategies 
Zeisberger et al. (2017) present dividend recapitalization as an additional exit strategy. 
It is a partial exit for a PE fund, where the PE fund can withdraw cash from the portfolio 
company and reduce its capital at risk. The cash i.e., the dividend is issued with the port-
folio company’s excess cash or with additional debt and is paid to the limited partners 
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of the fund. The recapitalization does not affect the portfolio company’s ownership 
structure or does not dilute equity stakes.  
 
Additionally, Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) introduce buyback and write-off as two 
more exit strategies. The first one is an acquisition by the initial owners of the portfolio 
company, in which the initial owners buy back all the outstanding shares from the finan-
cial sponsors. The latter one is a situation, where there is no future for the portfolio 
company and the financial sponsor writes down the initial investment.  
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3 Initial public offerings 
In this section, initial public offerings are covered more deeply by going through the 
general process of going public and explaining how IPOs are valued.  Additionally, anom-
alies associated with IPOs are presented. Firstly, underpricing theories and previous ac-
ademic literature regarding aftermarket performance are introduced at a general level, 




3.1 The listing process 
The listing processes vary depending on the market and exchange, for example, the list-
ing process in the Nordic countries follows a similar procedure. Espinasse (2014) de-
scribes that the overall process starts 6 to 9 months before the shares are actually traded 
on the public market. At the beginning of the process, the underwriters are selected, 
and they form a syndicate for the transaction together with e.g., independent advisors, 
legal advisors, and broker-dealers. Ritter (2019) determines that the number of under-
writers has increased from one to almost seven underwriters for each listing during the 
last 10 years. According to Espinasse, the first phase in the listing process is due dili-
gence, where the issuer’s financials, business, and legal aspects are precisely examined, 
and a prospectus is drafted by the advisors included in the process. The finished pro-
spectus is offered to the market regulators or the stock exchange, depending on the 
company’s operating market.  
 
Espinasse (2014) defines that when the prospectus is accepted, the process proceeds to 
the marketing phase. The senior management of the issuer presents the investment 
case to the research analysts that are part of their syndicate. The research analysts form 
initial reports based on the investment case in order to set the price range for the IPO. 
Additionally, the issuer can join a pre-marketing tour to discuss the details of the invest-
ment case with institutional investors. After this, the investment case is published to all 
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investors and investors can start subscribing the shares. The final phase of the listing 
process is the first day of trading with the issuing company’s shares. 
 
 
3.2 IPO valuation 
Aggarwal, Bhagat and, Rangan (2009) determine that the valuation of IPOs is an im-
portant part of the IPO process because it drives the demand on the public market, and 
it allows the capital market players to value corporate assets. According to Espinasse 
(2014), the methods to value an IPO depend on the industry and the size of the IPO. 
Several methods can also be used to value a certain firm if it is operating in various in-
dustries and using one method would not be adequate. The valuation can be done with 
a standalone valuation or by comparing it to a listed benchmark.  
 
Espinasse (2014) describes that IPOs are often valued by using different valuation mul-
tiples based on the firm’s accounting information and comparing them to different listed 
benchmark multiples. Another common method is the discounted cash flow model 
(“DCF”) that focuses on estimating the future cash flows. DCF model relies mostly on 
assumptions and, therefore it is significant to have accurate financial forecasts for the 
company.   
 
Kim and Ritter (1999) empirically examined the use of accounting information with a 
comparable firm multiples approach. They used e.g., earnings multiples, sales, and cash 
flow multiples to value the IPOs.  They found that the use of multiples of comparable 
firms as benchmarks did not lead to accurate valuations if the historical accounting in-
formation was used without further adjustments. The inaccuracy derived from the great 
variations in price-to-earnings multiples (“P/E”) in the publicly traded firms. However, 
they found that using forecasted earnings for calculating the P/E improved the accuracy. 
Kim and Ritter emphasized the importance of investment bankers in the process of IPO 
valuation and suggested that any additional research regarding the market before de-
termining the offer price range could improve the accuracy of the valuation.  
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Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) studied IPOs in the U.S. from 1980 to 1997 and 
divided their sample into three portfolios based on three different multiples to figure 
out if IPOs are undervalued or overvalued. The multiples were price-to-sales (“P/S”), 
price-to-EBITDA (earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), and 
P/E. The valuation ratios were calculated for each IPO by dividing the offer price with 
the comparable firm’s market multiple. 
 
Purnanandam et al. (2004) found that IPOs were overvalued on average.  In more detail, 
the undervalued IPOs experienced the lowest level of underpricing which is contrary to 
the traditional asymmetric information theories. Additionally, they examined the differ-
ences in factors between the overvalued and undervalued IPOs. Results indicated that 
overvalued IPOs had lower profitability and higher growth forecasts whereas underval-
ued IPOs had vice versa. Purnanandam et al. also suggested that the role of IPO market-
ing affecting the IPO pricing should be better understood since it may create excess de-
mand for the issuing firm and causing the offer price to be higher. According to Aggarwal 
et al. (2009), the high level of underpricing complicates the valuation of IPOs. They stud-
ied IPOs with positive and negative earnings and how these fundamentals affected the 
valuation. The results indicated that IPOs with negative earnings are associated with 
higher valuations than IPOs with positive earnings.  
 
 
3.3 Performance of IPOs 
Underpricing, hot issue markets, and long-term aftermarket performance are anoma-
lies related to IPOs. These are extensively studied and identified globally over the years 
but are still remaining as a focus in the IPO literature as researchers are trying to find 
new potential explanations for the anomalies. In the following subchapters, each 





Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) have been among the first people to document that 
on the first trading day, issuing firm’s stock price has been substantially higher than the 
initial offer price. Earlier studies explaining the underpricing are based on the informa-
tional asymmetry between the issuing firm, underwriter, and investors, but more recent 
studies have been focused on studying the behavioral aspect of investors.  
 
The Winner’s Curse theory by Rock (1986), is one of the first asymmetric information 
models explaining the phenomenon. According to the model, there are two types of 
investors in the IPO market: the informed and uninformed investors. The former inves-
tors have better information about the probable cash flows of the issuing firm and the 
latter investors lack information availability. Rock assumes that the informed investors 
invest in attractive and underpriced IPOs whereas uninformed investors invest in the 
overpriced IPOs. To avoid the uninformed investors leaving the market, companies price 
their shares on discount to the fundamental value.   
 
Another model based on asymmetric information is presented by Baron (1982), where 
the issuers of the firm have limited information about the fundamental value and de-
mand of the firm’s shares compared to the investment bankers who provide advising 
and distribution services for the issuing firms. Uninformed issuers are in the need to 
trust the information received from the bankers and provide compensation to them re-
gardless of the uncertain effort of the investment bankers. When investment bankers 
are more informed than issuers, the new issues are underpriced as then the shares will 
be trading on the first trading day. 
 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) used Baron’s findings to test if the model holds when 
it is replicated to investment bank IPOs and when the investment bank itself is working 
as an underwriter. By following Baron’s findings, the investment bank’s value should be 
correctly priced in the considered situation. However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens got 
contrary results to Baron’s model and found that IPOs of investment banks are even 
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more underpriced despite the investment bank underwriting their own issues than IPOs 
of investment banks that do not issue their own shares. 
 
Signaling hypothesis theory by Welch (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber (1989), show that 
issuing firms use underpricing to signal their firm’s quality and fundamental value. The 
less-informed investors believe that the issuing firm is a high-quality firm and, therefore 
are eager to buy the cheap shares. The theory also states that with underpricing, more 
highly qualified firms can receive higher returns in following equity issuances. 
 
Welch (1992) presents an informational cascades hypothesis, whereby investors decide 
to invest in IPOs if other investors have also invested in the IPO and may disregard the 
relevant information they carry about the firm.  An issuer has the incentive to underprice 
an IPO so that investors would start buying the shares and, therefore get others to buy 
the shares also regardless of the information the investors have. 
 
According to the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, presented by Tinic (1988), issuing firms 
underprice to avoid legal liabilities. The hypothesis assumes that the probability of liti-
gations is reduced when initial returns on the first trading day are positive and large. 
Lin’s, Pukthuanthong’s and Walker’s (2013) study supports the hypothesis and finds a 
positive relationship between the litigation risk and underpricing in an international 
sampling. The results show that IPOs with larger litigation risks are more probable to 
experience a higher level of underpricing. However, Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) do 
not accept the hypothesis, since they find that underpricing is not an effective way of 
lowering the probability of litigation.  
 
Habib and Ljungvist (2001) provide another explanation for the level of IPO underpricing 
and why issuers are generally accepting underpricing.  IPOs may be more underpriced if 
issuers have no reasons to care about the level of underpricing. Issuers care about the 
level of underpricing and try to affect it, when there are more shares to sell and, there-
fore, to lose.  The issuers can affect the level of underpricing by choosing the underwriter 
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and the exchange where to issue shares. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), the 
decision-makers, CEOs or financial sponsors, behind the issuing firm prefer to choose 
underwriters that have a history of underpricing as then they can receive side payments. 
 
 
3.3.2 Hot and cold issue markets 
 
The phenomenon of hot and cold issue markets was firstly introduced by Ibbotson and 
Jaffe (1975). They determine hot issue markets as periods when new equity offerings 
have substantially higher initial returns and when the level of new listings is higher than 
on average. Additionally, Ibbotson and Jaffe concluded that if an investor can recognize 
a hot issue period, they are able to earn abnormal returns.  
 
According to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), the extreme levels of underpricing cannot 
be explained by informational asymmetry theories but by investor behavior. The IPO 
markets experienced extreme levels of underpricing and multiple listings during the dot-
com bubble from 1999 to 2000. Therefore, the dot-com bubble can be considered as a 
hot issue market. Investors were hyping and getting optimistic about the companies and 
their future prospects, causing the stock prices to jump. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm studied 
that the level of underpricing was approximately eight times bigger during the bubble 
than the average level of 13 percent underpricing in the U.S. IPO markets. Westerholm 
(2006) studied the listing activity, listing requirements, and initial returns in the Nordic 
IPO markets from 1991 to 2002. Findings show that firms operating in the same industry 
tend to cluster and list at about the same time. Industry clustering and higher listing 
requirements are positively related to high initial returns but negatively affect the long-
run aftermarket performance. An example from Finland from 1999 to 2000 shows that 
the majority of the Finnish IPOs were operating in the computer and software industry. 
 
Michala (2019) studied whether PE-backed IPOs are any different from non-backed IPOs 
in terms of information asymmetry, the timing of the listing, and post-IPO survival from 
1975 to 2013.  The results indicated that PE-backed companies did not time the listings 
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when the market was experiencing a hot issue market and financial sponsors did not 
make premature IPOs. However, if a PE-backed company was listed during a hot issue 
market, the probability to delist was bigger. 
 
 
3.3.3 Aftermarket performance 
 
The long-term aftermarket performance of IPOs has also been extensively studied be-
sides the underpricing phenomenon and hot issue markets.  Theories explaining the 
long-term performance of IPOs are based on the irrational behavior of an investor and 
investor sentiment. However, there are also theories arguing that the phenomenon of 
long-term underperformance of IPOs does not exist. 
 
According to the divergence of opinion hypothesis by Miller (1977), investors have in-
consistent opinions about the valuation of an IPO. The optimistic investors cause the 
stock prices to jump during the first trading day but their opinion changes towards the 
pessimistic investors’ opinions when time moves on, causing the stock prices to fall. 
Purnanandam et al.’s (2004) results were consistent with the hypothesis. The fads hy-
pothesis, presented by Shiller (1990), states that underpricing is not the reason for the 
positive abnormal initial returns on the IPO’s first day of trading. The IPOs can be cor-
rectly valued before listing but investors overvalue the IPO on the aftermarket because 
of irrational over-optimistic forecasts, called “the fads”.  
 
The overconfidence hypothesis by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) argues 
that investors react to private information with overconfident but contrarily to the pub-
licly available information. According to the theory, the firm is overvalued before the 
IPO and continues to be more overvalued after the first day of trading. However, the 
overvaluation does not continue for years, causing the IPO to underperform in the long 
run. This theory was also supported by Purnanandam et al. (2004) as their sample of 
IPOs were overvalued at the offer price and in the short run but returned to fair value in 
the long run.  
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The Windows opportunity hypothesis, introduced by Ritter (1991), argues that when in-
vestors are overoptimistic and overvalue a firm, issuers can sell the shares at a higher 
price and, thus take advantage of the windows of opportunity. Ritter examined 1526 
companies going public from 1975 to 1984 in the U.S. market and their long-term per-
formance. His results show that issuing firms underperformed 17% on average com-
pared to a sample of matching non-issuing firms on the 3-year holding period after the 
initial public offering. Underperformance was worse during high activity listings and for 
young firms, which is consistent with the investor over-optimism and the fads hypothe-
sis. The performance of issuing firms compared to the benchmarks was calculated with 
wealth relatives (“WRs”) and the mean WR was 0.83 for the sample, indicating that IPOs 
underperformed.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) studied IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (“SEOs”) with 
more extensive data from 1970 to 1990 in the U.S. market. The results are similar to 
Ritter’s (1991) previous research, as the IPOs and SEOs underperformed compared to 
the non-issuing firms on the three-year holding period but also continued in the years 
four and five. Loughran and Ritter determined that investors would need to invest 44 
percent more money in the new issues to get the same level of wealth as investing in 
the non-issuing firms for five years after the first trading day.   
 
Studies around Europe follow the evidence from the U.S. Espenlaub, Gregory, and Tonks 
(2000) studied the long-run performance with an extensive dataset of 588 IPOs in the 
UK from 1985 to 1992 by using several alternative methods e.g., CAPM, Fama-French 
model, size effects and RATS model as benchmarks. Additionally, both event-time re-
turns and calendar-time returns were calculated. They found that by using the event-
time approach, firms had significantly negative abnormal returns compared to all differ-
ent benchmarks. Alternatively, by using the calendar-time approach, the underperfor-
mance was fairly weaker. Àlvarez and Gonzáles (2005) studied IPOs in Spain from 1987 
to 1997 with 3-year and 5-year holding periods. The results are in line with previous 
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studies about the long-term performance of IPOs even though the dataset included only 
112 IPOs. Thomadakis, Nounis, and Gounopoulos (2011) studied IPOs in Greece from 
1994 to 2002 with a similar approach as Ritter (1991) and Espenlaub et al. and found 
that during the 3-year holding period IPOs underperformed.  
 
The long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs in the Nordic countries was studied by 
Westerholm (2006) from 1991 to 2002. In Finland and Sweden IPOs underperformed 
but Denmark and Norway contrarily outperformed the market. Finland performed 
slightly better than Sweden even though both countries had been affected by the dot-
com bubble. Norway performed the best of the Nordic countries and outperformed the 
market by 3.3 percent per year since it is considered as a strong economy with high 
listing requirements.   
 
Table 1. Summary of previous studies on initial and long-run performance of IPOs. Initial 
returns with * are market-adjusted. The last column refers to the method used to meas-
ure the long-run performance and indicates the holding period in months. 
Author(s) Market Period IPOs Initial returns Long-run Method 
Ritter (1991) U.S. 1975-1984 1526 14,1%* 0.83 WR36 
Loughran et.al 
(1995) U.S. 1970-1990 4753 n/a 0.80 WR36 
Espenlaub et al. 
(2000) U.K. 1985-1992 588 n/a -15,9% CAAR36 
Purnanandam et 
al. (2004) U.S. 1980-1997 2288 11,4% -19,4% BHAR60 
Àlvarez et al. 
(2005) Spain 1987-1997 112 13,0%* 0.78 WR36 
Westerholm 
(2006) Finland 1991-2002 55 21,90 % -41,2% BHAR60 
 Denmark 51 8,50 % 10,2%  
 Norway  102 22,20 % 38,8%  
 Sweden  82 15,90 % -2,9%  
Thomadakis et. al 




Table 1 summarizes the international evidence about the long-term performance and 
initial returns of IPOs. The buy-and-hold returns (“BHAR) and wealth relatives (“WR) are 
the most common methods to measure long-term performance but some of the previ-
ous studies used several different methods and benchmarks to calculate the perfor-
mance. In that case, the most relevant method is selected for this study to be presented. 
To conclude based on the international evidence, IPOs have been underpriced and have 
underperformed consistently the benchmarks regardless of the market, time period, or 
the length of the holding period. The evidence on the Nordic market is not consistent 
and, therefore this study may clarify the evidence. 
 
 
3.4 Performance of PE- and VC-backed IPOs 
When focusing on IPOs backed with financial sponsors, the academic literature provides 
more versatile evidence. The previous academic literature regarding the performance 
of PE- and VC-backed IPOs are focused on the largest exchanges in the world e.g., in the 
U.S., UK, or France. The Nordic countries have remained as a minority in the academic 
literature, as the private equity market is not yet as extensive as in the U.S. or elsewhere 
Europe. Additionally, the results from different markets may vary because it depends on 
how mature investments the certain fund has made and whether it has been considered 
as a contributing factor. 
 
Brav and Gombers’ study (1997) focused solely on the VC-backed IPOs in the US from 
1975 to 1992. The results indicated that VC-backed IPOs performed better than non-
backed IPOs over a five-year holding period in equal-weighted returns. Value-weighting 
the returns lowered the underperformance between the IPOs.  Evidence from Japan by 
Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000) is partially contrary to the results by Brav and 
Gombers. Hamao et al. studied 355 Japanese IPOs from 1989 to 1995 and found that 
VC-backed IPOs do not perform better in the long run than other IPOs. However, if the 
firm was financially sponsored by a foreign-owned or independent venture capitalist, 
the long-run performance was better. 
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Bergström et al. (2006) studied the long-run performance of PE-backed IPOs and non-
backed IPOs on the Paris Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange from 1994 to 2004. 
The performance was considered on three different time horizons: six months, three 
years, and five years. Bergström et al. found that non-backed IPOs tend to be more un-
derpriced than PE-backed IPOs and that PE-backed IPOs outperformed non-backed IPOs 
on average on both exchanges in each time horizon. The average underpricing was 
9,33% for PE-backed IPOs and 12,87% for non-backed IPOs. The abnormal returns were 
negative for both VC- and PE-backed IPOs on equal- and value-weighted basis. However, 
the only positive returns were on the post-six-month period for PE-backed IPOs.  
 
Levis (2011) studied the aftermarket performance of PE-backed IPOs compared to VC-
backed and other non-backed IPOs on the London Stock Exchange in a time period of 
1992–2005, similarly as Bergstöm et al. (2006). He focused also on the fundamental 
characteristics, as size, profitability, operational efficiency, and industry structure, and 
examined how these factors differ in VC- and PE-backed IPOs. Additionally, Levis com-
bined the performance and fundamental characteristics by studying the relationship be-
tween them. Levis documented that PE-backed IPOs are generally larger in size, have 
more profitable sales and higher leverage ratios, and are less underpriced when com-
pared to IPOs backed with different financial sponsors. BHARs were positive and signifi-
cant for PE-backed IPOs and contrarily worse for other IPOs, following the same phe-
nomenon as in Bergström et al. (2006) study. However, the fundamental characteristics 
size and book-to-market effects did not explain the better performance for PE-backed 
IPOs, but the level of debt and equity had a positive impact on the performance.  
 
Bessler and Seim (2012) focused similarly as Brav and Gombers (1997) on VC-backed 
IPOs but in Europe and with more recent data from 1996 to 2010 and had similar results 
that VC-backed IPOs significantly outperformed the non-backed IPOs. However, the pre-
vious studies by Brav and Gombers, and Levis (2011) found that VC-backed IPOs have 
the tendency to perform poorly but Bessler and Seim reported that VC-backed IPOs 
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generated positive returns from the first day of trading to two years after listing and 
only then turned negative. Additionally, a study by Belghitar and Dixon (2011) in the UK 
revealed that VC-backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-backed IPOs and that VC-
backed IPOs did not outperform the non-backed IPOs. They suggested that the VC’s ex-
perience and capability to monitor investments may signal an important message to in-
vestors at the time of an IPO. Additionally, Belghitar and Dixon observed that studies 
between the U.S and UK market are not directly proportional since VC investments in 
the UK market are more focused on late-stage investments than in the U.S market. 
 
A more recent study from the U.S market by Buchner, Mohamed, and Wagner (2019) 
examined the short-term performance but also the long-term aftermarket performance 
from 2000 to 2014. A difference for the earlier studies is that the non-backed IPOs were 
excluded from the comparison, and the study solely focused on VC- and PE-backed in-
vestments. Additionally, it was compared which financial sponsorship added more value 
to their companies when firm characteristics were considered.  
 
Results from Buchner et al.’s (2019) study were contrary to Brav and Gompers’ (1997) 
and Levis’ (2011) studies as PE- and VC-backed IPOs had no significant performance dif-
ference on the 3-year holding period by using BHARs. However, the authors applied 
other methodologies that considered the efficient use of assets to generate returns. By 
using return on assets or operating margins, results were significant and showed that 
PE-backed IPOs outperformed the VC-backed IPOs in operating performance. In addi-
tion, Buchner et al. found that PE funds are able to add more value to their firms than 
VC funds. The performance differences were controlled with several firm characteristics 







Table 2. Summary of previous studies on long-run performance of IPOs with PE owner-
ship. The ownership column refers to the type of financial sponsor that is the subject of 
research. The last column presents the method used to measure the long-run perfor-
mance and also indicates the holding period in months. 





Brav et al. 
(1997) U.S. 1975-1992 VC,NB 0,88 n/a 0,71  WR60 
Hamao et al. 
(2000) Japan 1989-1995 VC,NB -9,60 % n/a -11,60 % BHAR36 
Bergström 




1994-2004 VC,PE,NB n/a -28,61 % -72,94% CAR36 
Levis (2011) U.K. 1992-2005 VC,PE,NB -3,92 % 13,84 % -20,2% BHAR36 
Belghitar et 
al. (2011) U.K. 1992-1996 VC,NB -13,03 % n/a -14,45% BHAR36 
Bessler and 
Seim (2012) Europe 1996-2010 VC,NB -6,34 % n/a n/a BHAR25 
Buchner et 
al. (2019) U.S. 2000-2014 VC,PE 27,10 % 20,40 % n/a BHR36 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the previous evidence on the long-run performance with different 
private equity ownerships. Long-run returns of VC-backed IPOs show a pattern of un-
derperforming their PE-backed counterparts and outperforming non-backed counter-
parts. The previous evidence also indicates that BHARs for VC-backed and non-backed 
IPOs are negative. However, BHARs for PE-backed IPOs are varying but consistently per-
form better than VC-backed and non-backed IPOs in the long run.  
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4 Data and methodology 
In this chapter, the data, and methodology used to study the two research hypotheses 
are presented. The first hypothesis suggests that private equity ownership influences 
the underpricing of IPOs in the Nordic markets and the second hypothesis assumes that 
IPOs with PE ownership perform better in the long run than IPOs with VC ownership or 
without any financial sponsor. This chapter consists of four subchapters. Firstly, it is ex-
plained in more detail how the data has been collected and formed. Secondly, the Nor-
dic private equity market is presented and thirdly, the research methodology is intro-
duced. Lastly, the different regression models are presented. 
 
 
4.1 Data description 
The data for the number of IPOs, the stock prices, firm-specific characteristics, and own-
ership type was collected from the Thomson Reuters database. The final data sample 
consists of 279 IPOs. From the original data sample, some of the IPOs had to be excluded 
due to missing information regarding e.g., stock prices, tickers to identify the IPO, or 
because the IPO was not found on the web. Additionally, if a firm had not been listed at 
least for three years during the chosen time period, it was excluded. Iceland was also 
fully excluded from the Nordic countries because it was not part of the chosen bench-
mark. However, the exclusion of Iceland did not affect the sample significantly. The final 
sample may include some errors because part of the data was gathered manually but 
any conflicting information e.g., regarding private equity ownership or issue prices were 
cross-checked. The daily stock prices were gathered for the 3-year holding period and 
the firm-specific characteristics, revenue, EBITDA, total assets, and total debt, were 
gathered for the IPO date. Additionally, the market index data for the MSCI Nordic Coun-
tries index was retrieved from the Thomson Reuters database. The index comprises 
large and mid-cap segments in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
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The time period considered in this study is between April 2001 and March 2018. Table 
3 below separates the IPOs by country and year. The table shows that Sweden has been 
the most active of all countries and Denmark and Finland the most inactive during the 
17-year time period. IPO markets experienced a high level of listing activity during the 
years 2006 and 2007 due to the bull market before the financial crisis in 2008. The year 
after, Nordic markets experienced a low listing activity as there was only one IPO in Nor-
way. However, from the year 2014 to 2018, the listing activity has been higher than ever 
before. This indicates that the IPO market in the Nordics has developed and matured.  
In the next chapter, the Nordic private equity market will be explained more profoundly. 
 
Table 3. Volume distribution across year and country. *2018 includes only 4 months. 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total 
2001 1 0 2 3 6 
2002 0 1 0 4 5 
2004 0 0 3 1 4 
2005 0 2 3 3 8 
2006 2 1 1 7 11 
2007 5 1 8 8 22 
2008 1 0 1 3 5 
2009 0 0 1 0 1 
2010 3 0 4 4 11 
2011 1 0 3 7 11 
2012 1 1 2 0 4 
2013 3 2 4 0 9 
2014 2 4 9 14 29 
2015 2 9 5 26 42 
2016 3 5 3 23 34 
2017 3 9 8 44 64 
2018* 0 5 2 6 13 
Total 27 40 59 153 279 
 
 
Table 4 divides the sample by the ownership type. Almost 23 percent of the total IPOs 
have some private equity ownership in their operations and out of the 64 PE-backed 
IPOs, 22 are VC-backed and 42 are PE-backed. The majority of all IPOs do not have any 
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financial sponsorship. After the year 2010, IPOs with private equity ownership have be-
come more common than before but there are still more non-backed IPOs. 
 
Table 4. IPOs by ownership type. *2018 includes only 4 months. 
Year NS PEALL PE VC Total 
2001 6 0 0 0 6 
2002 1 4 4 0 9 
2004 2 2 0 2 6 
2005 6 2 1 1 10 
2006 7 4 3 1 15 
2007 12 10 3 7 32 
2008 5 0 0 0 5 
2009 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 6 5 4 1 16 
2011 8 3 2 1 14 
2012 3 1 0 1 5 
2013 5 4 1 3 13 
2014 21 8 6 2 37 
2015 31 11 10 1 53 
2016 30 4 4 0 38 
2017 60 4 2 2 68 
2018* 11 2 2 0 15 
Total 215 64 42 22 279 
 
 
In the next table, the firm-specific statistics such as size and operational characteristics 
are summarized for each IPO group. In terms of the firm size, measured as market capi-
talization or total assets, PE-backed companies are the largest when compared to non-
backed or VC-backed companies. The market value for PE-backed companies is almost 
four times bigger than the market value is for the other counterparts. Between VC-
backed and non-backed companies, the market value is slightly bigger for VC-backed 
companies, but the amount of total assets is lower than for non-backed companies.  
 
Other operational characteristics, for example net sales and asset turnover, follow the 
same pattern. PE-backed companies have the highest sales of all the IPO groups and are 
also more effective to generate sales as the asset turnover ratio is higher. However, the 
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ratio should be compared with companies operating in the same industry and, therefore 
it cannot be interpreted unequivocally. The operating margins are slightly higher for 
non-backed companies than for PE-backed companies but for VC-backed companies, the 
EBITDA margin is the worst. The leverage ratio is substantially highest for VC-backed 
companies. However, the data sample for the VC-backed companies is relatively small 
and, therefore there can be some individuals that drive the leverage ratio up. For PE-
backed companies, the leverage ratio is almost three times higher than the ratio for non-
backed companies as PE-backed companies optimize the use of debt in order to enhance 
future returns.  
 
As earlier discussed in this study, VC-backed companies are early-stage startups with 
growth potential but are currently small in terms of size and sales. On the other hand, 
companies backed by a growth equity fund or a buyout fund are operating in more ma-
ture businesses, are larger companies, and have higher leverage ratios. Table 5 provides 
evidence for the general characteristics of companies with different PE ownership. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the IPO group 
  
 
NB PEALL PE VC ALL IPOs 
 
Variable Measure (215) (64) (42) (22) (279) Unit 
Market value Median 94 222 382 99,7 117 MEUR 
Net sales Median 32 165,8 412,6 14 43 MEUR 
Total assets Median 51 159,7 310,6 40 70 MEUR 
Asset turnover Median 0,69 0,95 1,05 0,38 0,75  
EBITDA Median 2,8 6,4 17,2 0 3 MEUR 
EBITDA% Median 8,12 4,9 7,9 0 7 % 
Price to Book Median 4,42 4,09 4,39 4,09 4,42  
Leverage Median 23,4 52,53 59,6 359 29,74 % 
 
 
Table 6 separates the data by industries. Technology, healthcare, and industrials are the 
most common industries in the whole data sample.  When the sample is divided into 
different groups by PE ownership, the industry distribution is somewhat different.  VC-
backed companies are most focused on healthcare and the second most on technology. 
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In turn, PE-backed companies are most focused on consumer non-cyclicals and, secondly 
on industrials. The most prevalent industries among non-backed companies are 
healthcare, industrials, and financials.  Out of the industries, Government Activity, and 
Academic and Educational Services are barely present in the sample.  
 
Table 6. Relative industry distribution of IPOs. 
Industry NB PEALL PE VC All 
Academic & Educational Services 0,5 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,4 % 
Basic Materials 2,3 % 1,6 % 2,4 % 0,0 % 2,2 % 
Consumer Cyclicals 7,9 % 26,6 % 40,5 % 0,0 % 12,2 % 
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 3,3 % 9,4 % 7,1 % 13,6 % 4,7 % 
Energy 5,1 % 1,6 % 2,4 % 0,0 % 4,3 % 
Financials 9,3 % 3,1 % 2,4 % 4,5 % 7,9 % 
Government Activity 0,5 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,4 % 
Healthcare 21,9 % 20,3 % 7,1 % 45,5 % 21,5 % 
Industrials 15,8 % 17,2 % 26,2 % 0,0 % 16,1 % 
Real Estate 6,5 % 1,6 % 0,0 % 4,5 % 5,4 % 
Technology 25,1 % 18,8 % 11,9 % 31,8 % 23,7 % 
Utilities 1,9 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 1,4 % 
Total 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % 
 
 
Table 7 reports the annual levels of underpricing between the 17-year time period. In 
2001, the annual underpricing has been almost 45% which is the highest level in the 
considered time period. The high level of underpricing can have some influences from 
the dot-com bubble in 1991 to 2000. Underpricing remained at a low level before the 
financial crisis in 2008, but after the crisis, IPOs were highly overpriced on average for a 
couple of years. Another crisis, the European debt crisis, occurred in 2012 and affected 
also the Nordic IPO market, leading to slightly overpriced IPOs for two years.  After 2014, 
the levels of underpricing have remained below 10% even though the number of listings 
has increased a lot. To summarize, it can be noticed that the levels of underpricing and 
listing activity follow the state of the economy as Loughran and Ritter (2004) found. 
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Firstly, IPOs are underpriced on average and after the bubble bursts, IPOs become over-
priced and after time moves on, IPOs return to being underpriced.  
 
Table 7. Annual levels of underpricing. *2018 includes only 4 months. 
Year Underpricing Number of IPOs 
2001 44,68 % 6 
2002 -19,88 % 5 
2004 -3,93 % 4 
2005 2,25 % 8 
2006 -5,82 % 11 
2007 3,20 % 22 
2008 -19,47 % 5 
2009 -40,78 % 1 
2010 9,09 % 11 
2011 1,62 % 11 
2012 -4,57 % 4 
2013 -9,66 % 9 
2014 4,18 % 29 
2015 1,39 % 42 
2016 7,61 % 34 
2017 8,79 % 64 
2018 0,39 % 13 
 
 
4.2 Nordic private equity market 
This study focuses on the private equity market in the Nordic countries and the countries 
considered are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. For the past decades, the Nor-
dic countries have developed into a more mature market and the PE activity has in-
creased substantially. The Nordic countries have been able to develop several success 
stories, such as Skype and Spotify, and the value of Nordic expertise and vision has 
grown. 
 
Covid-19 has had a huge impact on PE and VC deal activity in the Nordics in 2020. As 
figure 3 shows, the amount of PE deals and the deal values have returned to 2017 levels. 
Report “Nordic Private Capital Breakdown” by Pitchbook analyzes how the PE and VC 
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markets have developed during 2020. PE deals were withdrawn or postponed, and fi-
nancial sponsors were focusing on portfolio triage instead of making new deals. Addi-
tionally, the report revealed that almost half of the closed deals were proceeded in Swe-
den and the most popular sector among the deals was technology, which is in line with 
the industry distribution in this study. 
 
Figure 3. PE deal activity in the Nordic countries (Pitchbook 2021). 
 
 
While the PE deal activity has slowed down in the Nordics in 2020, the VC deal activity 
has increased as the “Nordic Private Capital Breakdown” report and figure 4 indicates. 
The year was the best so far in the whole Nordic VC market as 5.1 billion euros has never 
been invested in early-stage and fast-growing startups before. Nordic countries are ideal 
for VC funds because the economies have e.g., large public sectors, functioning welfare 
systems, and willingness to fund and help new companies with accelerator and incuba-
tor programs. The deal value was driven by the big deal size, approximately 70% of all 
the VC deals were over 25 million euros and the trend is upward. According to the re-
port, software was the most common sector, but fintech and digital health are also be-
coming more and more a focus for Nordic startups. 
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Figure 4. VC deal activity in the Nordic countries (Pitchbook 2021). 
 
 
Another report by Pitchbook, “European PE Breakdown”, shows how the size of the Nor-
dic PE market is only a small fraction of the European market and how the market did 
not face as a significant drop in the deals or the deal values as the Nordic market in 2020.  
Last year, 4179 deals were done with an accumulated value of 449.1 billion euros, com-
pared to 2019 when 4259 deals were done with a value of 462 billion euros. 
 
Argentum’s research “The state of Nordic private equity 2019“ documented that the 
sustainable approach is one of the main interests among private equity funds and insti-
tutional investors in the future. By considering climate issues while advising their port-
folio companies, PE funds can advance the development of sustainability significantly. 
Additionally, companies with e.g., innovative technologies and clear strategies with cli-
mate goals can be great investment opportunities for PE funds. 
 
 
4.3 Methodology  
This study focuses on examining the impact of private equity ownership on the under-
pricing and the long-run performance of IPOs. Underpricing is used to determine if the 
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IPO is under-or overvalued and by comparing the initial returns, the impacts of private 
equity ownership on the pricing can be identified. The long-run performance is exam-
ined by using the BHAR method and the impacts of pre-IPO ownership on the post-IPO 
performance are studied with four different OLS regressions.  The returns are calculated 
by using daily prices and compared to the MSCI Nordic Countries index. All the methods 
follow previous academic literature on underpricing, IPOs, and private equity involve-
ment and, therefore the use of them has an empirical justification. In this section, the 
methods and variables used in this study are presented in more detail.  
 
 
4.3.1 Initial returns 
Initial returns, in other words, underpricing, are defined as the percentage difference 
between the IPO offer price and the closing price on the first day of public trading as 
formula 1 presents.  This method is stabilized in the academic literature (Ritter, 1991; 
Purnanandam et al., 2004; Álvarez et al, 2005) to calculate the first-day IPO returns.  
 





In addition to examining the underpricing phenomenon itself, the first-day return is also 
used as an independent variable in the OLS regressions. In more detail, it is used to ex-
amine how the first-day return affects the long-term performance. Bergström et al. 
(2006) and Levis (2011) found that VC-backed IPOs tend to have higher first-day returns 
than PE-backed IPOs because of the company’s stage at the lifecycle and the information 
available. On the other hand, when compared to non-backed IPOs, the returns were 
even higher and, therefore were more underpriced. However, Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, 
and Vetsuypens (1990) found that the monitoring of VC funds has a lowering effect on 
the underpricing of VC-backed IPOs. On a general level, Levis reported that first-day re-
turns had a negative impact on long-term performance. 
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4.3.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Previous academic literature e.g., Ritter (1991), Bergström et al. (2006), and Levis 
(2011), presents two different approaches to calculate the long-term performance: the 
cumulative abnormal returns (“CAR”) and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (“BHAR”). 
Earlier studies, such as Ritter (1991) and Bergström et al. (2006), have used both meth-
ods but more recent studies like Levis (2011) have excluded the CAR method due to 
biased results in the long term. Therefore, to get comparable and accurate results with 
earlier studies, the BHAR method is followed in this study. The BHAR method is calcu-
lated as:  
 
(2) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 =  1
𝑁
∑ [(∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑖=1 ) − (∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑖=1 )]𝑁𝑖=1  
 
, where 𝑟𝑖𝑡is the raw return for one IPO and 𝑟𝑏𝑡 is similarly for the benchmark used at 
the event month t. 
 
BHARs are calculated for all the IPOs by adding the whole 36-month returns to the rest 
of the month’s returns that is left after the first day of trading. By following the approach 
by Levis (2011), the timeframe for 36 months is used. According to Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai (1999), long-term BHARs are positively skewed and, which leads to negatively bi-
ased t-statistics. Therefore, to remove the bias, bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-sta-
tistics are used. It is represented in the following equations by Lyon et al.: 
 






















𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡is the sample mean of BHARs, 𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the cross-sectional sample standard devia-
tion of BHARs and n is the number of firms in the sample. The coefficient 𝛾 is an estimate 
for the skewness.   
 
 
4.3.3 Private equity ownership 
Dummy variables are used to identify whether a firm has any private equity ownership 
pre-IPO. The ownership can be PE, VC, or not having a financial sponsor at all. PEall has 
a value of 1 if the firm has any PE ownership or respectively a value of 0 if the firm has 
no PE ownership. Dummies PE and VC can be interpreted similarly, but PE represents 
majority ownership of a more established company and VC minority ownership of an 
early- or late-stage ownership. The ownership is identified in the sample according to 
the Thomson Reuters database. 
 
4.3.4 Controls 
The firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. To avoid the results 
being driven by very large or small firms, the variable is used to normalize the data. Brav 
and Gompers (1997), and Bergström et al. (2000) found that firm size is one important 
factor explaining the returns as the results were positive and highly significant. Large 
firms performed better than small firms.  
The price to book variable is calculated as the company’s price per share to its book value 
per share. It describes whether the company is considered as a value or growth stock. A 
low ratio indicates a value stock and, contrarily a growth stock. The findings of Berg-
ström et al. (2006) showed that the book-to-market effects did not explain the better 
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performance for PE-backed IPOs compared to IPOs backed with different financial spon-
sors. According to the results by Levis (2011), the coefficient is negative and significant. 
The independent variable leverage is calculated as total debt to common equity during 
the year of the IPO. Levis (2011) found that leverage had a significant impact on the long-
term performance of IPOs and observed that PE-backed firms had more debt than VC- 
or non-backed firms. PE-backed firms are more established companies than VC-backed 
firms and, therefore are more able to take higher amounts of leverage.  
Two more independent variables are added to the latter regressions to control the op-
erating characteristics. The first one is asset turnover, calculated as sales to assets, and 
the second one is the operating margin, calculated as EBITDA to total revenue. These 
ratios measure the operating performance and how efficiently the firm is operating. The 
findings of Levis (2011) showed that PE-backed firms were more efficient compared to 
VC-backed firms when both ratios were used. 
Dummy variable is used to identify whether the market is experiencing hot or cold peri-
ods. The hot issue markets are identified in a similar manner as Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) 
firstly introduced it. The hot issue markets are determined as periods when IPO markets 
are experiencing above-average initial returns, meaning that the level of underpricing is 
high, and the number of listings is above average or vice versa for the cold issue markets.  
The different market cycles in the data are identified by calculating the average initial 
returns and volume for the IPOs. Periods above average are considered the hot market 
and below average the cold market. 
 
 
4.4 Regression models 
Multivariate analysis is used to identify long-run performance differences between PE-
backed, VC-backed, and non-backed IPOs and to find out, which factors explain the long-




The dependent variable is the 36-month BHAR and remains the same through all the 
regressions. Additionally, the hot issue market phenomenon is taken into account by 
having hot and cold dummy in each model. The regressions follow two different ap-
proaches. In the first regression, the firm-specific characteristics are controlled at the 
time of the IPO for the IPOs with any PE ownership and IPOs without PE ownership. In 
the second regression, the PE-and VC-backed dummies are introduced. The firm charac-
teristics are controlled similarly at the time of the IPO but are examined separately for 
the groups with different ownership. 
 
(6)  𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1first day return + 𝛽2 log ( 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝐵3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
 𝐵4𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵5𝐻𝑜𝑡/𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀 
 
(7) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1first day return + 𝛽2 log( 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝐵3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
 𝐵4𝑃𝐸 + 𝐵5VC +𝐵6𝐻𝑜𝑡/𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀 
 
In the third and fourth models, the regressions are extended to study the effects of op-
erational factors, such as asset turnover and EBITDA margin. The other explanatory var-
iables and sample categorization remain the same. 
 
(8) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1first day return + 𝛽2 log ( 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝐵3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
 𝐵4𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝐵6𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴% +  𝐵7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝐵8𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵9𝐻𝑜𝑡/𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀 
 
(9) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1first day return + 𝛽2 log ( 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝐵3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +




In this chapter, the results of the empirical study are presented. Firstly, the first day 
returns for the IPOs are given in different market cycles and separate groups with and 
without different PE ownerships. Secondly, BHARs for the IPOs are presented in differ-
ent time periods. Additionally, F-test is given as an alternative approach to study the 





Results for underpricing are presented in table 8.  Panel A shows the results for the en-
tire time period on equal- and value-weighted basis. In equal-weighted terms, all the 
IPOs have the tendency to be underpriced at 5% and 10% significance levels and the 
average underpricing is 3,79 %. However, when categorizing the IPOs into groups with 
different PE ownerships, only the underpricing of non-backed IPOs remains significant 
at 5% and 10% significance levels. Non-backed IPOs seem to be more underpriced than 
any of the other groups with an average underpricing level of 5,10 %. This is in line with 
findings by Bergström et al. (2006) and Belghitar and Dixon (2001) as non-backed IPOs 
are more underpriced than PE- and VC-backed IPOs. Surprisingly, PE-backed IPOs are 
underpriced, and VC-backed IPOs are overpriced, indicating that PE-backed IPOs are 
more underpriced. These findings are contrary to the findings of Levis (2011), although 
the results are insignificant. 
 
Similarly, in value-weighted terms, all IPOs are underpriced but the level of underpricing 
is lower, 0,03% on average. The underpricing of non-backed IPOs is also significant on 
value-weighted terms at a 10% level and the level of statistical significance has also in-
creased in the groups with PE ownership, although the results remain insignificant. The 
first-day returns are driven by the small-cap firms since the underpricing level in value-
weighted terms is close to zero. Additionally, the returns of small-cap firms decrease the 
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overpricing of VC-backed IPOs. Non-backed IPOs are the least underpriced and PE-
backed IPOs are still more underpriced than VC-backed IPOs.   
 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) observed that VC-backed IPOs are less underpriced in the 
U.S because of the VC funds’ certification role. The uncertainty of the portfolio firms is 
reduced when the firm is managed by a VC fund and, therefore investors are more will-
ing to invest in an IPO. This certification cannot be observed in the Nordic market with 
this data sample because the results indicate that IPOs with VC ownership experience 
overpricing in equal-weighted terms and that non-backed IPOs experience the lowest 
degree of underpricing in value-weighted terms.  
 
The overall underpricing has been higher around the world when the effect of PE own-
ership has not been considered. Levis (2011) observed that the average underpricing in 
the UK was 18,6% from 1992 to 2005 and Westerholm (2006) found similarly in the Nor-
dic market that the average underpricing was between 8,50 and 22,20 percent from 
1991 to 2002. A similar phenomenon can be observed when the effect of PE ownership 
has been considered. Bessler and Seim (2012) examined the European market from 
1996 to 2010 and found that the average underpricing for VC-backed IPOs was 8,4%. 
Additionally, Bergström et al. (2006) found that the average underpricing was 9,33% for 
PE-backed IPOs and 12,87% for non-backed IPOs in the UK and France markets.  In this 
study, the average underpricing is lower than the previous studies in Europe indicate. 
 
The first hypothesis of this study assumes that private equity ownership affects the level 
of underpricing.  H1 can be accepted because the first day returns of PE-backed and VC-
backed IPOs are different from the returns of all IPOs and, therefore it can be stated that 
PE ownership has an effect on the level of underpricing. The direction of the impact is 
not clear since the level of underpricing changed by using different weighting methods.   
 
Underpricing and the volume of IPOs in hot and cold issue markets are different. During 
a hot period, underpricing and the volume is higher than during a cold period in equal-
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weighted terms. Additionally, compared to the entire period, the level of underpricing 
is also slightly higher than during a hot period. These observations are in line with the 
phenomenon of hot issue markets found by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). Underpricing for 
all the IPOs and non-backed IPOs is significant at a 5% level. During a cold period, the 
IPOs with PE ownership experience overpricing on average. However, all results for un-
derpricing are insignificant in cold periods. In value-weighted terms, there are no clear 
differences in the level of underpricing among the different business cycles. The value-
weighted average for all the IPOs is 0,04% and is the only one with significant results at 
a 5% level in hot and cold periods. Bessler and Seim (2012) found that the level of un-
derpricing jumped to 20% during a hot issue market between 1998 to 2000. However, 
before the financial crisis in 2008, underpricing remained below 5%, which is similar to 



















Table 8. Underpricing in different business cycles. The sample consists of 279 IPOs of 
which 215 are non-backed, 42 PE-backed, and 22 VC-backed IPOs. Underpricing is calcu-
lated as the percentage difference between the IPO initial offer price and the closing 
price on the first day of public trading. * refers to statistical significance at 10% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. T-statistics are given in the parentheses. 
Underpricing    All NB PEALL PE VC 
Panel A. Entire period 
Equally-weighted average 3,79%** 5,10%** -0,62% 0,67% -3,09% 
  (2.12) (2.36) (-0.22) (0.20) (-0.59) 
Value-weighted average 0,03%** 0,02%* 0,22% 0,36% 0,05% 
  (2.14) (1.80) (1.49) (1.49) (0.30) 
  N 279 215 64 42 22 
Panel B. Hot period 
Equally-weighted average 4,37%** 5,81%** 0,25% 0,058% -0,58% 
  (2.14) (2.30) (0.08) (0.16) (-0.11) 
Value-weighted average 0,04%** 0,03% 0,27% 0,39% 0,10% 
 (2.04) (1.62) (1.49) (1.49) (0.44) 
N 208 154 54 39 15 
Panel C. Cold period 
Equally-weighted average 2,11% 3,33% -5,33% 1,94% -8,44% 
  (0.56) (0.8) (-0.74) (0.38) (-0.84) 
Value-weighted average 0,04% 0,05% 0,07% 0,57% 0,05% 
  (0.84) (0.84) (0.09) (0.39) (0.03) 
  N 71 61 10 3 7 
 
 
5.2 Performance of IPOs 
Results for the long-term aftermarket performance of IPOs, calculated as BHARs, are 
presented in table 9. The returns are given in both equal- and value-weighted terms, 
and are reported for 1-, 12-, 24-, and 36-month periods. MSCI Nordic Countries index is 






Table 9. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the Nordic countries. The sample consists of 
279 IPOs of which 215 are non-backed, 42 PE-backed, and 22 VC-backed IPOs. MSCI Nor-
dic Countries index is used as the benchmark. Returns are calculated as the percentage 
returns from the first day close price to the end of each month that is presented in the 
Months -column. * refers to statistical significance at 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and 
*** at the 1% level. T-statistics are given in the parentheses. 
Months Equally-weighted average (%) Value-weighted average (%) 
  All IPOs NB PEALL PE VC All IPOs NB PEALL PE VC 
N 279 215 64 42 22 279 215 64 42 22 
1M 3,78%* 5,83%** -3,08 % 0,11 % -9,16 % 0,02%** 0,01 % 0,21%** 0,36%** -0,14 % 
 
(1.80) (2.32) (-1.02) (0.03) (-1.48) (2.26) (0.97) (2.06) (2.10) (-0.46) 
12M 13,05%*** 17,05%*** -0,42 % 6,63 % -13,88 % 0,06%*** 0,11%*** 0,12 % 0,23 % -0,65 % 
 
(3.49) (3.82) (-0.06) (0.98) (-1.05) (2.83) (4.40) (0.50) (0.57) (-0.84) 
24M 23,35%*** 28,37%*** 6,49 % 10,21 % -0,62 % 0,09%*** 0,13%*** 0,21 % 0,35 % 0,00 % 
 
(4.20) (4.26) (0.76) (1.23) (0.08) (3.62) (4.74) (0.85) (0.84) (-0.03) 
36M 37,02%*** 45,54%*** 8,39 % 20,45%* -14,64 % 0,15%*** 0,25%*** 0,26%* 0,48%** -0,97 % 
  (4.61) (4.59) (0.84) (1.74) (-0.62) (4.10) (3.59) (1.96) (2.24) (-1.33) 
 
 
Overall, there are more positive than negative BHARs for all of the groups in equal- and 
value-weighted terms.  This observation can indicate that IPOs in the Nordic market per-
form generally better than the index and, which is contrary to Ritter’s (1991, 1995) find-
ings that IPOs usually underperform their benchmarks in the long run in the U.S. In turn, 
Westerholm (2006) found also overperformance in the Nordic countries. The average 
60-month BHARs varied between -41,2% and 38,8%, which are in line with the results of 
this study. The average 36-month BHAR for all the IPOs is 37,02% in equal-weighted 
terms and 0,15% in value-weighted terms. The returns of small-cap firms drive the value-
weighted returns down.  
51 
When looking IPOs with different PE owners, PE-backed IPOs outperform VC-backed 
IPOs in each time period and both calculation methods. This is fully consistent with Buch-
ner et al. (2019) and partially consistent with the findings of Levis (2011), Bergström et 
al. (2006), who documented that PE-backed IPOs perform better than other IPO groups.  
Returns for PE-backed IPOs are only statistically significant at a 10% level in the 36-
month period in equal-weighted terms but value-weighting the returns, the significance 
increases, and both first month and 36-month returns are significant at a 5% significance 
level. The 36-month returns for PE-backed IPOs are 20,45% in equal-weighted terms and 
0,48% in value-weighted terms.  
 
VC-backed IPOs perform the worst of all the other groups and underperform the index 
in almost each time period varying between -0,62% and -14,64% in equal-weighted 
terms and between 0,00% and -0,97% in value-weighted terms. The latter returns are 
so close to zero, that there is barely any underperformance and, thus it can be concluded 
that VC-backed IPOs perform similarly as the market index. In addition, the results for 
VC-backed IPOs are statistically insignificant from zero. The poor performance of VC-
backed IPOs decreases the overall BHAR for the group of all IPOs with PE ownership. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) documented also that VC-backed performed poorly but still 
outperformed the non-backed IPOs in the U.S. This is partly contradicting the results of 
this study as non-backed IPOs perform better. However, the findings of Belghitar and 
Dixon (2011) support the results in this study as they found that VC-backed IPOs did not 
outperform the non-backed IPOs in the UK market. 
 
When focusing on equal-weighted returns, non-backed IPOs perform the best and out-
perform the IPOs with different financial sponsorships. This is contrary to the prevalent 
evidence that e.g., Brav and Gompers (1997), Hamao (2000), Levis (2011), Bergström et 
al. (2006), and Belghitar et al. (2011) observed around the world.  However, in value-
weighted terms, IPOs with PE ownership perform better than non-backed IPOs and VC-
backed IPOs and, which the findings of Levis and Bergrström et al. fully supports. Ac-
cording to these conflicting findings, H2 could be accepted in value-weighted terms but 
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not in equal-weighted terms and therefore unanimous conclusion cannot be made. 
Thus, it cannot be concluded whether a company having a PE owner in their operations 
creates long-term value compared to a company not having a PE owner in their opera-
tions during the time periods considered in this study in the Nordic market. In addition, 
the method for calculating BHARs can affect the outcome.  
 
Below table 10 presents F-test as another approach to examining the long-run perfor-
mance differences between the groups with or without PE ownership. Similarly, as in 
the previous table in equal-weighted terms, non-backed IPOs perform the best and VC-
backed IPOs perform the worst.  Non-backed IPOs have on average twice as high returns 
as PE-backed IPOs. Additionally, VC-backed IPOs underperform the index on average. 
The results are significant at a 1% level for non-backed and PE-backed IPOs and non-
backed IPOs and VC-backed IPOs. When comparing PE-backed and VC-backed IPOs, the 
differences are insignificant. F-test approach supports that H2 cannot be accepted as 
PE-backed IPOs do not perform better in the long run than the other groups. 
 
Table 10. F-test for examining the differences in the long-run performance in a 36-
month time period. * refers to statistical significance at 10% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and *** at the 1% level. 
  PE NB PE VC NB VC 
Mean % 20,45 % 45,54 % 20,45 % -14,64 % 45,54 % -14,64 % 
Listings 42 215 42 22 215 22 
F 3,65***  1,35  4,92*** 
p-value 0,00 0,25 0,00 
 
 
5.3 Multivariate regressions of 36-month aftermarket performance 
Multivariate cross-sectional regressions are used to study the long-run performance fur-
ther by finding out which factors explain the 36-month aftermarket performance. The 
results for the four different regressions are presented in table 11 below. Regressions 1 
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and 2 consider the IPO characteristics at the time of the offer and regressions 3 and 4 
extend the models by considering the operating characteristics.  
 
The coefficients for intercept, first-day return and hot issue market variable are all sig-
nificant in each regression. The positive intercept supports the 36-month outperfor-
mance of all the IPOs. In addition, the coefficient for first-day return is positive, indicat-
ing a positive relationship between underpricing and long-run performance. However, 
according to previous academic literature, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), and 
Levis (2011) found a negative correlation between underpricing and long-run perfor-
mance.  
 
Regarding the hot issue market variable, there is a negative relationship between the 
hot market and BHARs. When markets experience high listing activity and a company 
has an initial public offering, the long-run performance tends to be lower. This is con-
sistent with Ritter’s (1991) hypothesis of windows of opportunity as he found that com-
panies underperform worse during high listing activity periods and are more overpriced 
than during other market periods.  
 
The private equity ownership variables explain partially the aftermarket performance. 
When the PE investors are divided into two groups, PE investors have a positive influ-
ence on the long-run performance and VC investors have the contrary effect. These find-
ings are consistent with the results in table 9 and are also supported by the prevalent 
evidence by Levis (2011), and Bergström (2006) who found that PE ownership has a pos-
itive effect on the long-run performance. However, the results are only significant for 
VC-backed IPOs and, therefore the effect of PE ownership is not clear and H2 cannot be 
accepted. To conclude, by following the previous academic literature, VC-backed IPOs 
tend to underperform in the long run, but the effect of PE ownership seems to have a 
positive impact on the long-run performance but is not statistically proven. 
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The other remaining variables do not explain the long-run performance as the variables 
are not significant, but the direction of the effect can be observed. Variable for size 
shows that smaller firms would have better 36-month BHARs, which is contradicting to 
the assumption of this study. Additionally, out of the other operational characteristics, 
leverage, price-to-book, asset turnover, and EBITDA-margin would explain the aftermar-
ket performance only a small fraction or not at all. Levis (2011) found that leverage had 
a positive effect on the long-run performance of IPOs but Cao and Lerner (2009) did not 
find a relationship. Also, Bergström et al. (2006) did not find that book-to-market would 























Table 11. Multivariate regressions of long-run performance in a 36-month holding pe-
riod. The dependent variable is the 36-month BHAR compared to the MSCI Nordic Coun-
tries index. * refers to statistical significance at 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at 










Intercept 1,122** 1.287** 1.177** 1.369*** 
 (2,27) (2,54) (2,32) (2,62) 
First-day return % 0,017*** 0,017*** 0,017*** 0,017*** 
 (5,54) (5,47) (5,41) (5,37) 
Log_total assets -0,097 -0,124 -0,109 -0,138 
 (-1,00) (-1,27) (-1,11) (-1,38) 
P/B 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,27) (0,00) (0,28) (-0,01) 
Asset turnover   -0,011 -0,031 
   (-0,15) (-0,40) 
EBITDA %   0,000 0,000 
   (0,18) (0,10) 
Leverage %   0,000 0,000 
   (0,64) (0,62) 
PEALL dummy -0,211  -0,208  
 (-0,91)  (-0,88)  
VC dummy  -0,612*  -0,619* 
  (-1,69)  (-1,69) 
PE dummy  1,27  3,19 
  (0,05)  (0,11) 
HOT/COLD market dummy -0,415* -0,456** -0,407* -0,450** 
  (-1,89) (-2,06) (-1,84) (-2,02) 
Adjusted R2 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 
N 279 279 279 279 
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6 Conclusions 
This study examines the underpricing and long-run performance of initial public offer-
ings (“IPO”) in the Nordic countries in time period between 2001 and 2018. More spe-
cifically, this study focuses on IPOs with different private equity (“PE”) owners and com-
pares the levels of underpricing and the long-run performances in between the PE own-
ership groups. In addition, the factors explaining the long-run performance are studied. 
The different PE owners are venture capital (“VC”), growth equity, and buyout. In this 
study, PE-backed IPOs refer to growth equity and buyout-funds. The final sample con-
sists of 279 IPOs in which 215 are non-backed, 42 PE-backed, and 22 VC-backed. The 
Nordic countries considered in this study are Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.  
 
The first hypothesis of this study assumes that PE ownership influences the level of un-
derpricing. The results are significant only for the whole sample and for non-backed IPOs 
in equal- and value-weighted terms. The average underpricing all the IPOs are experi-
ence is 3,79% and for non-backed 5,79%. Even though, the results are insignificant for 
PE- and VC-backed IPOs, the results indicate that PE-backed IPOs experience some un-
derpricing and VC-backed IPOs experience barely or are even overpriced. According to 
these findings, H1 is accepted as the level of underpricing is not similar throughout the 
groups. Previous academic literature, e.g., studies by Bergström et al. (2006), and Bel-
ghitar and Dixon (2011), suggests that non-backed IPOs are the most underpriced which 
is in line with the results of this study. Following the findings of e.g., Brav and Gompers 
(1997), Katz (2009), and Cao and Lerner (2009), the results of this study indicate that the 
reputation of PE funds is considered by financial investors.  
 
In addition, the results also show that the timing of an IPO does affect the level of un-
derpricing and the long-run performance. During a hot issue market, the level of under-
pricing is higher, and the 3-year long-run performance is worse than during other peri-
ods. This is in line with the phenomenon of hot issue markets found by Ibbotson and 
Jaffe (1975) and the findings of Ritter (1991). These findings support also the fact that 
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during hot issue markets the average quality of issuing companies is lower as the thresh-
old for equity issuance is significantly lower during a market boom.  
 
The second hypothesis of this study is related to the long-run performance of IPOs with 
different PE owners. H2 suggests that PE-backed IPOs perform better in the long-run 
than VC- and non-backed IPOs. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns show that PE-backed 
IPOs outperform significantly the VC-backed IPOs but not the non-backed IPOs as previ-
ous academic literature suggests in equal-weighted terms. However, in value-weighted 
terms, PE-backed outperform both VC-backed and non-backed counterparts, but the 
performance differences are a lot smaller.  Therefore, H2 could be accepted in value-
weighted terms but not in equal-weighted terms. An additional approach to test the 
long-run performance, F-test, would support the rejection of H2. These results could 
indicate that PE- and VC-owners focus solely on the short-term value creation during the 
holding period of the target company. Moreover, the results show that the overperfor-
mance of IPOs is mainly driven by smaller companies in the Nordic market. 
 
After all, the results of this study need to be interpreted with caution. The data for the 
IPOs and the issuing company’s characteristics are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters 
database. Part of the data needed to be cross-checked with the company’s web pages 
and annual reports. Additionally, the sample does not include all the companies listed 
between 2001 and 2018 because there was not enough or needed information availa-
ble. The Nordic PE market is relatively young and therefore the number of IPOs backed 
by different PE owners is constricted and can therefore distort the overall conclusion of 
Nordic PE operators. However, the data sample is fairly extensive regarding the size of 
the Nordics and can therefore give some insight of the market. 
 
In future research, there are several ways to extend the base study. For example, the 
holding period could be extended to five years to see fully comparable results with pre-
vious studies in the Nordic countries such as Westerholm (2006). Another way to extend 
would be to consider the impacts of Covid-19. Underpricing, short- and long-term 
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performances could be examined around the world during a pandemic. Additionally, the 
year 2020 can be considered as a hot issue market due to high listing activity and, thus 
it would be interesting to see the levels of underpricing and the future aftermarket per-
formance. Moreover, as sustainability is the focus of different PE funds today, the re-
turns from sustainable investments could be considered as contributing factors in the 
regression models. It would be fascinating to examine how much of the overall BHAR is 
explained by the returns from sustainable investments. The regression could also in-
clude a sustainability dummy to indicate if the company is clearly a “green company” or 
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Appendix 1. The sample 
Issue date Issuer Issue date Issuer 
04/05/2001 Consorte Group ASA 08/06/2015 Pihlajalinna Oy 
06/06/2001 BTS Group AB 09/06/2015 Magnolia Bostad AB 
18/06/2001 Statoil ASA 10/06/2015 Collector AB 
20/06/2001 Danware Data A/S 10/06/2015 Inission AB 
26/06/2001 Vitrolife AB 10/06/2015 Vistin Pharma ASA 
31/08/2001 
RNB Retail and 
Brands AB 16/06/2015 Hovding Sverige AB 
08/03/2002 QPR Software Plc 16/06/2015 
Coor Service Man-
agement Holding AB 
17/05/2002 Alfa Laval AB 17/06/2015 Alimak Group AB 
07/06/2002 Intrum Justitia AB 18/06/2015 Nobina AB 
19/06/2002 
Ballingslov Internati-
onal AB 18/06/2015 Pandox AB 
19/06/2002 Nobia AB 19/06/2015 Europris ASA 
11/03/2004 Opera Software ASA 26/06/2015 Hugo Games A/S 
25/03/2004 
Yara International 
ASA 30/06/2015 Capio AB 
28/05/2004 MediStim ASA 07/07/2015 Kotipizza Group Oy 
02/12/2004 Probi AB 21/07/2015 FIT Biotech Oy 
24/02/2005 PetroJack ASA 08/10/2015 
CLX Communicati-
ons AB 
18/04/2005 Neste Oy 16/10/2015 Bravida Holding AB 
27/05/2005 AffectoGenimap Oy 02/11/2015 Skandiabanken ASA 
05/10/2005 Indutrade AB 02/11/2015 Kid ASA 
24/10/2005 Powel ASA 12/11/2015 




ASA 25/11/2015 Dometic Group AB 
09/11/2005 Orexo AB 02/12/2015 A City Media AB 
08/12/2005 Hakon Invest AB 02/12/2015 
Scandic Hotels 
Group AB 
23/02/2006 KappAhl AB 02/12/2015 Evli Pankki Oy 
04/05/2006 Electra Gruppen AB 03/12/2015 Camurus AB 
22/05/2006 Dios Fastigheter AB 08/12/2015 Stillfront Group AB 
07/06/2006 Insplanet AB 11/12/2015 Consti Oy 




29/06/2006 Wirtek A/S 10/02/2016 
Scandinavian To-
bacco Group A/S 
05/09/2006 Melker Schorling AB 16/03/2016 Garo AB 
15/09/2006 Biovitrum AB 17/03/2016 LeoVegas AB 






15/12/2006 Tilgin AB 26/04/2016 Nepa AB 
13/02/2007 Enalyzer A/S 28/04/2016 Lehto Group Oy 
15/03/2007 Mobwatcher AB 29/04/2016 Resurs Holding AB 
23/03/2007 NEAS ASA 03/05/2016 
Tokmanni Group 
Corp 
27/03/2007 Algeta ASA 31/05/2016 
Paradox Interactive 
AB 
30/03/2007 Esoft Systems A/S 08/06/2016 B2Holding ASA 






21/05/2007 Cecon ASA 14/06/2016 TF Bank AB 
25/05/2007 
Protector Forsikring 
ASA 16/06/2016 GomSpace Group AB 
29/05/2007 Exiqon A/S 17/06/2016 
Norwegian Finans 
Holding ASA 
12/06/2007 SRV Yhtiot Oy 22/06/2016 
Lauritz.com Group 
A/S 






12/10/2007 Systemair AB 29/09/2016 
Internationella Eng-
elska Skolan i Sve-
rige Holdings II AB 
19/10/2007 
HMS Industrial Net-
works AB 03/11/2016 Cellink AB 
26/10/2007 
West International 
AB 10/11/2016 Heeros Oy 
01/11/2007 Avega AB 22/11/2016 THQ Nordic AB 
08/11/2007 Erria A/S 23/11/2016 
Alligator Bioscience 
AB 
14/11/2007 Duni AB 24/11/2016 SERNEKE Group AB 
22/11/2007 Vinovo AB 30/11/2016 DNA Oy 
17/12/2007 
Aker Philadelphia 
Shipyard ASA 30/11/2016 Volati AB 
20/12/2007 Trifork A/S 01/12/2016 Arcus ASA 
27/05/2008 
Trygga Hem Skandi-
navien AB 05/12/2016 
ByggPartner i Da-
larna Holding AB 
18/06/2008 Senzime AB 07/12/2016 Smart Eye AB 
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23/06/2008 
PCI Biotech Holding 
ASA 09/12/2016 Edgeware AB 
11/07/2008 Prime Office A/S 16/12/2016 Aino Health AB 
03/10/2008 
Global Health Part-
ner AB 19/12/2016 Acarix AB 
22/12/2009 Pertra ASA 22/12/2016 SeaTwirl AB 
05/02/2010 North Energy ASA 22/02/2017 Oncopeptides AB 
24/03/2010 Arise Windpower AB 28/02/2017 
IRLAB Therapeutics 
AB 
21/05/2010 Bridge Energy ASA 23/03/2017 Next Games Oy 
28/05/2010 True Heading AB 23/03/2017 MIPS AB 




Chr Hansen Holding 
A/S 31/03/2017 Ambea AB 
30/06/2010 Morpol ASA 04/04/2017 Isofol Medical AB 
07/07/2010 Pallas Group AB 04/04/2017 Fondia Oy 
05/10/2010 PANDORA A/S 06/04/2017 SSM Holding AB 
24/11/2010 Zealand Pharma A/S 07/04/2017 BerGenBio ASA 
10/12/2010 
Gjensidige Forsikring 
ASA 07/04/2017 Actic Group AB 
02/02/2011 Ecomb AB 10/04/2017 




mon ASA 05/05/2017 Bambuser AB 
15/04/2011 
Karolinska Develop-
ment AB 11/05/2017 Instalco AB 
20/05/2011 FinnvedenBulten AB 15/05/2017 Integrum AB 
25/05/2011 AroCell AB 16/05/2017 Kamux Oy 
26/05/2011 Moberg Derma AB 19/05/2017 Munters Group AB 
27/05/2011 
Transmode Holding 
AB 23/05/2017 Medicover AB 
23/06/2011 Boule Diagnostics AB 24/05/2017 Abelco AB 
05/07/2011 
Hoegh LNG Holdings 
Ltd 29/05/2017 Ayima Group AB 
07/07/2011 
Danske Andelskas-
sers Bank A/S 30/05/2017 TerraNet Holding AB 
02/12/2011 Hofseth Biocare ASA 31/05/2017 Boozt AB 
14/06/2012 Selvaag Bolig ASA 01/06/2017 Western Bulk ASA 
15/10/2012 Siili Solutions Oy 13/06/2017 
SpareBank 1 Ostlan-
det 
18/10/2012 Borregaard ASA 16/06/2017 Nitro Games Oy 
20/03/2013 Asetek A/S 21/06/2017 Sedana Medical AB 




09/04/2013 Serodus ASA 21/06/2017 
Fastighets AB Tria-
non 
28/06/2013 Matas A/S 23/06/2017 Conferize A/S 
05/07/2013 Ocean Yield ASA 21/07/2017 
Seamless Distribu-
tion Systems AB 
03/09/2013 NorDiag ASA 21/09/2017 SenzaGen AB 
14/10/2013 
Orava Asuinkiinteis-
torahasto Oy 28/09/2017 
Inhalation Sciences 
Sweden AB 
28/11/2013 Restamax Oy 29/09/2017 
Rovio Entertainment 
Oy 
06/12/2013 Napatech A/S 29/09/2017 Infront ASA 
21/02/2014 Bufab AB 02/10/2017 
Sparebank 1 Nord-
vest 
13/03/2014 ISS A/S 06/10/2017 Balco Group AB 
21/03/2014 
Hemfosa Fastigheter 
AB 10/10/2017 Handicare Group AB 
03/04/2014 Recipharm AB 11/10/2017 Terveystalo Oy 
08/04/2014 
Vardia Insurance 
Group ASA 11/10/2017 Webstep ASA 
09/04/2014 D Carnegie & Co AB 12/10/2017 BioArctic AB 
11/04/2014 
Scanship Holding 
ASA 13/10/2017 Climeon AB 
22/04/2014 Saniona AB 13/10/2017 
WeAreQiiwi Interac-
tive AB 
11/06/2014 Herantis Pharma Oy 19/10/2017 
Global Gaming 555 
AB 
12/06/2014 Besqab AB 27/10/2017 Bibbinstruments AB 
17/06/2014 
Com Hem Holding 
AB 27/10/2017 




AB 06/11/2017 Bublar Group AB 
20/06/2014 Zalaris ASA 08/11/2017 
Crayon Group Hol-
ding ASA 
27/06/2014 Scandi Standard AB 16/11/2017 Gofore Oy 
01/07/2014 cXense AS 16/11/2017 Seafire AB 
01/07/2014 Havyard Group ASA 17/11/2017 Orphazyme A/S 
26/09/2014 Inwido AB 22/11/2017 Touchtech AB 
29/09/2014 Aker Kvaerner ASA 22/11/2017 IRRAS AB 
02/10/2014 Scatec Solar ASA 24/11/2017 2cureX AB 
03/10/2014 XXL ASA 24/11/2017 TCM Group A/S 
10/10/2014 Granges AB 06/12/2017 Tempest Security AB 
16/10/2014 Absolent Group AB 07/12/2017 DevPort AB 
17/10/2014 Entra ASA 08/12/2017 Efecte Oy 
14/11/2014 Nexstim Oy 08/12/2017 Mag Interactive AB 
21/11/2014 Lifco AB 11/12/2017 Acconeer AB 
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24/11/2014 United Bankers Plc 12/12/2017 Lyko Group AB 
04/12/2014 NP3 Fastigheter AB 12/12/2017 
Colabitoil Sweden 
AB 
05/12/2014 Nixu Oy 13/12/2017 
Toadman Interactive 
AB 
12/12/2014 Tobin Properties AB 22/12/2017 
Hitech & Develop-
ment Wireless Swe-
den Holding AB 
06/02/2015 Ferratum Oy 04/01/2018 Obstecare AB 
06/02/2015 Eltel AB 09/01/2018 CGit Holding AB 
13/02/2015 Dustin Group AB 15/01/2018 InfraCom Group AB 
18/02/2015 
The Lexington Com-
pany AB 09/02/2018 Admicom Oyj 





logy Oy 22/03/2018 Harvia Oyj 
20/03/2015 
Evolution Gaming 
Group AB 22/03/2018 Elkem ASA 





Oy 23/03/2018 Altia Oyj 
27/03/2015 Troax Group AB 28/03/2018 
BBS Bioactive Bone 
Substitutes Oy 
24/04/2015 Tobii AB 06/04/2018 Iconovo AB 
21/05/2015 Robit Plc 18/04/2018 Fluicell AB 
22/05/2015 Multiconsult ASA 24/04/2018 
Enersense Internati-
onal Oy 
02/06/2015 SciBase Holding AB   
 
 
 
